Calingman's You're listening to the Hour of the Time. I'm William Cooper. Ladies and gentlemen, we continue today with part three of the continuation of our affidavit, contract, notice, declaration of citizenship, demand, and jurisdiction challenge. If you've been listening to this all along, you've already heard some pretty astounding things in the law. Some of you who thought I was crazy before and have been following this documentation in the law now know that I'm right on the items that I've covered and I will continue. Ladies and gentlemen, when the sheeple in this country ever wake up, if they ever wake up, the tyrants in Washington, D.C. had better have found a very deep hole. And it better be a big hole because there's an awful lot of cockroaches that need to crawl into it. Don't go away. I'll be right back. And we will continue right where we left off on Friday. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. We'll be right back. That's the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. We have a list enumerating every published CDO from 1954 to the present linked from our website at harvest-trust.org. If you've never been there, you need to go. Harvest-trust.org. By review of these various CDOs, it is possible to trace the authority which is the subject of Section 7608, which the Internal Revenue Service claims gives them the authority to investigate the citizens of the several states. The only possible CDOs which could delegate Section 7608 authority are numbered 31, 33, and 34. On April 30, 1956, CDO number 31 was issued delegating to the Assistant Commissioner and the Director of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division the authority to administer and enforce Chapters 51, 52, and 53 of the Code. These are the ATF chapters, for those of you who are familiar with the Code, in addition to a few other functions. A few months later, CDOs number 33 and 34 were issued, and these orders also related to alcohol and tobacco taxes. Once these units of the Internal Revenue Service had been delegated these enforcement responsibilities, Congress thereafter, in 1958, created Section 7608, and the regulations at 301.7608-1 was promulgated in 1959. This is a list containing the sites where these and subsequent revisions of these orders were published. CDO number 31, small a, original at 21 federal regulations, 3083-1956-1, CB1015. Small b, revision 1, 34 federal regulations, 87, 1969-1, CB379. Small c, revision 2, 35 federal regulations, 16808, 1970-2, CB487. Small d, revision 3, 36 federal regulations, 18678, 1971-2, CB524. Small e, revision 4, 36 federal regulations, 22607, 1971-2, CB525. CDO number 33, small a, original, 21 federal regulations, 4415, 1956-2, CB1375. And CDO number 34, small a, the original, at 21 federal regulations, 5851, 1956-2, CB1375. And small b, revoked, it was revoked, in 38 federal regulations, 33407, 1973-2, CB462. As can be seen from these orders, the same allowed for the seizure and forfeiture of property and the enforcement of the criminal laws. Logically, it is these orders which permitted the promulgation of the regulation at 301.7608-1. The Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service, which was the unit which was responsible for the administration enforcement of the laws, which were the subject of the CDOs number 31, 33, and 34. This ended with the creation of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, via Treasury Directive Order number 221 on June 6, 1972, C37 Federal Regulations 116696, 1972-1, CB777. Among other administration and enforcement functions transferred to BATF via this order were the following. Small a, chapters 51, 52, and 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and sections 7652 and 7653 of such code, insofar as they relate to the commodities subject to tax under such chapters. Small b, chapters 61 to 80, inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, insofar as they relate to the activities administered and enforced with respect to chapters 51, 52, and 53. Now, about two and a half years later, the Secretary issued TDO number 221-3, which can be found at 40 Federal Regulations 1084, 1975-1, CB 758, which delegated to the BATF the authority to administer and enforce chapter 35 and chapter 40 and 61 through 80, inclusive of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, insofar as they relate to activities administered and enforced with respect to chapter 35. Chapter 35 deals with wagering taxes, and chapter 40 concerns occupational taxes related to wagering. Some one and a half years later, TDO number 221-3, revision 1, was issued. The only real detectable distinction between the former and latter orders was the inclusion of the following phrase in the latter, quote, The Commissioner may call upon the Director for assistance when it is necessary to exercise any of the enforcement authority described in Section 7608 of the Internal Revenue Code, end quote. But on January 14, 1977, the Secretary transferred back to the Internal Revenue Service the enforcement duties relating to wagering via TDO number 221-3, revision 2. Thereafter, the authority of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms encompassed chapters 40, 51, 52, and 53 of the 1954 Code, in addition to the authority to enforce other non-code laws. It is of great significance that the repeal of Regulation 301.7608-1 occurred shortly after creation of the BATF. It no longer exists. The authority of BATF agents to exercise the functions under Section 7608 is found today in 27 CFR Section 70.28. In summary, Section 7608 requires delegations from the Secretary to enforcement agents. In reference to Section 7608, small a, it has been shown that this ATF authority, not IRS authority, has flowed through the ATF unit within the IRS, ultimately to be passed on to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms as a separate agency, however bogus it may be. The IRS has no enforcement authority under Section 7608 or 7608, small a, whatsoever, within the territorial boundaries of any state. But in the search for authority under Section 7608, small b, a review of all published TDOs and CDOs reveals that there appears to have been no such delegation whatsoever. Thus, if a special agent is conducting any investigation pursuant to the authority of Section 7608, that investigation encompasses violations only of the alcohol, tobacco, and firearms tax laws, and there is no apparent authority to conduct any federal income tax investigation which is possessed by any special agent at any time, at any place, whatsoever. Ninety-eight. That affiant filed Freedom of Information Act requests asking the Internal Revenue Service for specific documents which gave the Internal Revenue Service the authority to conduct an investigation of a citizen of Arizona. The Internal Revenue Service could not and did not produce any such documentation. We noticed Special Agent Schutnik and Assistant United States Attorney Weinrip to produce their credentials and documentation of their authority to conduct such an investigation. They refused because they could not, as no such documents exist. Ninety-nine. That of all the circuits, the Ninth Circuit has addressed jurisdictional issues more than any of the rest. That is the circuit to which the state of Arizona belongs. In United States v. Bateman, 34, capital F, period, 86, N, period, D, period, Cal, 1888, it was determined that the United States did not have jurisdiction to prosecute for a murder committed at the Presidio because California had never ceded jurisdiction. See also United States v. Tully, 140, capital F, period, 899, D, Mon, 1905. But later, California ceded jurisdiction for the Presidio to the United States and it was held in United States v. Watkins, 22, capital F, period, 2, small d, 437, N, period, D, period, Cal, 1927. That this enabled the U.S. to maintain a murder prosecution. Note that it was after California ceded the property to the United States. Ceded jurisdiction for the Presidio to the United States. See also United States v. Holt, 168, capital F, period, 141, W, period, D, period, Washington, 1909, United States v. Lewis, 253, capital F, period, 469, S, period, D, period, Cal, 1918, and United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276, F, that's capital F, period, 753, capital D, period, Oregon, 1921. Because the United States owned and had a state session of jurisdiction for Fort Douglas in Utah, it was held that the United States had jurisdiction for a rape prosecution in Rogers v. Squire, 157, capital F, period, 2, small d, 948, Ninth Circuit, 1946. But without a session, that is a session of land and jurisdiction, the United States has no jurisdiction. See Arizona v. Manipinny, 445, capital F, period, sup, period, 1123, capital D, period, Arizona, 1977. These cases from the United States Supreme Court and federal appellate courts set forth the rule that in criminal prosecutions, the government, as the party seeking to establish the existence of federal jurisdiction, must prove U.S. ownership of the property in question and a state session of jurisdiction. This same rule manifests itself in state cases. State courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and in a state criminal prosecution, the state must only prove that the offense was committed within the state and a county thereof. If a defendant contends that only the federal government has jurisdiction over the offense, he, as proponent for the existence of federal jurisdiction, must likewise prove United States ownership of the property where the crime was committed and state session of jurisdiction. Session must always be seated by the legislature of the state. Examples of the operation of this principle are numerous. Now listen to me very closely. A lot of you people in local law enforcement in the state of Arizona and all of the ranchers, the cattle ranchers in the state of Arizona, have been totally bamboozled by the federal government because you don't understand the principle of jurisdiction. Examples of the operation of this principle are numerous. In the state of Arizona, the state has jurisdiction over all federal lands in the public domain. The state never ceded jurisdiction of that property to the United States, and here is the court site. C. State v. Dykes, 114 Arizona, 592-562, capital P, period, 2, small d, 1090-1977. It's a shame that a lot of people who need to know this and could really profit from it are not even listening to this broadcast, and I'm not going to make any effort to seek them out and make sure that they get it because I don't see any of them standing up here by my side. In California, if it is not proved by a defendant in a state prosecution that the state has ceded jurisdiction, it is presumed the state does have jurisdiction over a criminal offense. C. People v. Brown, 69, California. C. People v. Mouse, 203, California. C. 782, 265, capital P, period, 944-1928. In Montana, the state has jurisdiction over property. If it is not proved, there is a state session of jurisdiction to the United States. C. State, X. Rel. Parker v. District Court, 147, Mon, period, 151, 410, capital P, period, 2, small d, 459-1966. The existence of a state session of jurisdiction to the U.S. ousts the state of jurisdiction. C. State v. Tully, 31, Montana, 365, 78, capital P, period, 760-1904. The same applies in Nevada. C. State v. Mack, 23, Nevada, 359, 47, capital P, period, 763-1897. And Pendleton v. State, 734, capital P, period, 2, small d, 693, Nevada, 1987. It applies in Oregon. C. State v. Chen Ping, comma, 91. Oregon, 593, comma, 176, capital P, period, 188, 1918. And State v. Aguilar, 85, Oregon, app, 410, comma, 736, capital P, period, 2, small d, 620, 1987. And in Washington, C. State v. Williams, 23, Washington, app, 694, comma, 598, capital P, period, 2, small d, 731, 1979. In People v. Hammond, 1, Illinois, 2, small d, 65, 115, N, period, E, period, 2, small d, 331, 1953, a burglary of an Internal Revenue Service office was held to be within state jurisdiction. State jurisdiction. The court holding that the defendant was required to prove existence of federal jurisdiction by U.S. ownership of the property and state session of jurisdiction. In two cases, from Michigan, larcenies committed at United States post offices, which were rented, were held to be within state jurisdiction. See People v. Burke, 161, Michigan, comma, 397, comma, 126, N, period, W, period, 446, 1910. And People v. Van Dyke, 276, Michigan, 32, comma, 267, N, period, W, period, 778, 1936. See also in Ree, Kelly, 311, Michigan, 596, comma, 19, N, period, W, period, 2, small d, 218, 1945. In Kansas City v. Garner, 430, capital S, period, W, period, 2, small d, 630, Missouri, app, 1968. State jurisdiction over a theft offense occurring in a federal building was upheld, and the court stated that a defendant had to show federal jurisdiction by proving U.S. ownership of the building and a session of jurisdiction from the state to the United States. A similar holding was made for a theft at a United States missile site in State v. Rendell, 146, Mon, period, 64, comma, 404, capital P, period, 2, small d, 327, 1965. In Pendleton v. State, comma, 734, capital P, period, 2, small d, 693, Nevada, 1987, the state court was held to have jurisdiction over a DUI, that's driving under intoxication, committed on federal lands, the defendant having failed to show U.S. ownership in state session of jurisdiction. In People v. Gerald, 40, miscellaneous, 2, small d, 819, comma, 243, N, Y, S, 2, small d, 1001, 1963, the state was held to have jurisdiction of an assault at a United States post office since the defendant did not meet his burden of showing presence of federal jurisdiction and because a defendant failed to prove title and jurisdiction in the United States for an offense committed at a customs station. State jurisdiction was upheld in People v. Fisher, comma, 97, A, period, that's capital A, period, capital D, period, 3, department, 1983. The proper method of showing federal jurisdiction in state court is demonstrated by the decision in People v. Williams, comma, 136, miscellaneous, 2, small d, 294, comma, 518, New York State, 2, small d, 751, 1987. This rule was likewise enunciated in state v. Berger, 33, Ohio, app, 3, small d, 231, comma, 515, capital N, period, capital E, period, 2, small d, 640, 1986. A case involving a DUI offense committed on the road near a federal arsenal. Now, I know that reading these cases may get old for some of you and some of you don't even know what it's about. But if I don't, you won't know where to go look for this information. None of you knew that the state of Arizona retained jurisdiction over all the federal land in public domain. None of you knew that. If you knew that, you ranchers wouldn't be having such a hard time with the federal government over grazing rights. Because it's within the jurisdiction of the state of Arizona, not the federal government. And you call me crazy. In Kirshner v. State, 493, capital P, period, 2, small d, 1402, Oklahoma, CR, period, app, period, 1972, the state was held to have jurisdiction of a drug sales offense occurring at an Air Force base, the defendant not having attempted to prove federal jurisdiction by showing title and jurisdiction of the property in question in the United States. See also, Tori v. State, comma, 540, capital P, period, 2, small d, 597, Oklahoma, CR, period, app, period, 1975. Similar holdings for murders committed at United States post offices were made in State v. Chen Ping, 91, Oregon, 593, comma, 176, capital P, period, 188, 1918. And in United States v. Pate, 393, capital F, period, 2, small d, 44, 7th Circuit, 1968. Another Oregon case, State v. Aguilar, 85, Oregon, app, 410, comma, 736, capital P, period, 2, small d, 620, 1987. Demonstrates this rule. And finally, in Curry v. State, 111, Texas, CR, 264, comma, 12, capital S, period, capital W, period, 2, small d, 796, 1928. It was held that in the absence of proof that the state had ceded jurisdiction of a place to the United States, the state courts had jurisdiction over an offense. 100. That in federal criminal prosecutions involving jurisdictional-type crimes, the government must prove the existence of federal jurisdiction by showing United States ownership of the place where the crime was allegedly committed and state session of jurisdiction. If the government contends for the power to criminally prosecute for an offense committed outside its jurisdiction, it must prove an extraterritorial application of the statute in question, as well as a constitutional foundation supporting the same. Absent this showing, no federal prosecution can be commenced for offenses committed outside its jurisdiction, period. These are all Supreme Court rulings. If you don't want to believe me, that's fine. Go argue with the Supreme Court of the United States of America. Don't do it with me, because I understand and know and have studied and I am quoting you the law. End quote. Condemnity Fund v. Pruitt, F-F-F-2-D-306-201-Oklahoma-308. 101. That a citizen or resident alien, that is resident versus non-resident, that a citizen or resident alien making a living within one of the 50 states of the Union has never been made liable by Congress for the payment of the income tax under Title 26, Subtitle A. Affiant and Affiant's wife have no liability under the law to file or pay the so-called income tax. The so-called income tax is unlawful and unconstitutional as applied to the citizens and others domiciled within the territorial boundaries of the Union States who earn a living within the Union States and are not engaged in excise taxable activities. 102. 102. That there are three sections of the Internal Revenue Code that addresses the making or filing of returns or statements, and these are the only ones. If you don't believe me, look it up. If you find another one, bring it to me and I will correct myself on the air. I don't want to be wrong, ladies and gentlemen. So if you're criticizing me, put up or shut up. 102. That there are three sections of the Internal Revenue Code that address the making or filing of returns or statements. That's sections 6001, 6011, small a, and 6012, small a. Section 6001. This section states in relevant part, Quote, Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title or for the collection thereof shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and, Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary it is necessary, he may require any person by notice served upon such person or by regulations to make such returns, render such statements, or keep such records, end quote. Therefore, section 6001 clearly does not create a requirement for every person to file, but only specific individuals, in effect, those made liable. This section does not, however, establish who is liable, does not establish the liability, but merely presumes it, and that is against the law. Cannot presume it. Must state who is liable. Section 6011, small a. This section states in relevant part, Quote, When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary, Any person made liable for any tax imposed by this title or with respect to the collection thereof shall make a return or statement, and Every person required to make a return or statement shall include therein the information required by such forms or regulations, end quote. Similar to section 6001, 6011, small a. Applies only to certain individuals and a liability for who those individuals are is not established, but again, presumed, which is against the law. Section 6012, small a. This section states in relevant part, Quote, Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle capital A shall be made by the following. 1. 1. Capital A. Every individual having for the taxable year gross income under this section, an individual is required to file under specific circumstances with respect to subtitle capital A, and the liability for any tax under subtitle A, that's capital A, is established elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code. In other words, the section 6012, small a requirement for returns to be made applies only those who are made liable under subtitle capital A. Therefore, it is clear from this section, as well as those previously cited, that the requirement to file is not an all-encompassing one, but is directly rated, related. Let me read this over again. My mouth is dry, folks, and I apologize. Therefore, it is clear from this section, as well as those previously cited, that the requirement to file is not an all-encompassing one, but is directly related to an explicit liability for a tax. Who is made liable? So far, none of us. 103. That the sections of the Internal Revenue Code, which actually establish a liability for a tax, are as follows. Here is the meat of the matter. Under subtitle capital A, income taxes, small a, section 402, small d, one, capital D, makes liable for a separate tax the recipient of a lump sum distribution from employee benefit plans. A client and a client's lawful wife are not a recipient of a lump sum distribution from any employee benefit plan. Small b, section 1461, makes liable every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under subchapter capital B. A client and a client's lawful wife do not deduct and withhold any tax under subchapter capital B. Under subtitle capital B, estate and gift taxes, small c, section 3405, small d, one, makes liable the payor of a designated distribution from a pension or annuity. A client and a client's lawful wife are not a payor of a distribution from any pension or annuity. Small d, section 3505, small a, and small b, make liable a lender, surety, or other person that pays wages directly to an employee and that is withholding. A client and a client's wife do not pay wages to any employees and we are not withholding. Small d, under subtitle capital D, miscellaneous excise taxes, small e, section 4401, small c, makes liable each person who is engaged in the business of accepting wagers. A client and a client's lawful wife are not engaged in the business of accepting wagers. Small f, section 4980, small b, makes liable an employer maintaining a qualified plan. A client and a client's lawful wife are not an employer maintaining a qualified plan. Under subtitle capital E, alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes, small g, section 5005, makes liable the distiller or importer of distilled spirits. A client and a client's lawful wife are not a distiller nor an importer of distilled spirits. Small h, section 5703, makes liable the manufacturer or importer of tobacco products and cigarette papers and tubes. A client and a client's lawful wife do not manufacture or import tobacco products, cigarette papers, or tubes. Here's the case authority. In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not... Let me back up because this is a quote. Case authority, quote, In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt, they are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the citizen, end quote. Gould versus Gould, comma 245, United States Supreme Court 151. Quote, Liability for taxation must clearly appear from statute imposing tax, end quote. Highly versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69, capital F, period 2, small d, 160. Quote, The taxpayer must be liable for the income tax. Tax liability is a condition precedent to the demand. Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly, does not cause liability, end quote. Quote, Quote, Engineers and Contractors, comma 713, capital F, period 2, small d, 1405. 104. There is only one section, ladies and gentlemen, section 6020 of the Internal Revenue Code, covering the preparation of returns by the Internal Revenue Service on a person's behalf. This section states in relevant part. Quote, 6020, small a. If any person shall fail to make a return required by this title or by regulations prescribed thereunder, but shall consent to disclose all information necessary for the preparation thereof, then, and in that case, the Secretary may prepare such return, which, being signed by such person, may be received by the Secretary as the return of such person, end quote. 6020, small b. If any person fails to make any return required by any Internal Revenue Law or regulation made thereunder, at the time prescribed, therefore, or makes willfully or otherwise a false or fraudulent return, end quote. Therefore, it is clear from this section that the Internal Revenue Service may prepare or execute returns on a person's behalf, but only when that person has a clearly established requirement to make a return and, with such person's consent to provide the necessary information. Section 6020 does not establish a requirement to make a return, however, but merely presumes it, which, again, is against the law. Furthermore, section 6020 clearly declares that any return prepared by the Internal Revenue Service on a person's behalf must be signed by that person. This is confirmed by the enforcing Regulation 26, Code of Federal Regulations 301.6020-1, which states in relevant part, quote, small a. Preparation of returns. 1. In general, if any person required by the Code or by the regulations prescribed thereunder to make a return fails to make such return, it may be prepared by the District Director or other authorized Internal Revenue Officer or employee, provided such person consents to disclose all information necessary for the preparation of such return. The return upon being signed by the person required to make it shall be received by the District Director as the return of such person, end quote. How many of you have had the Internal Revenue Service, when you were late or failed to make a return, prepare a return for you, sign it themselves without your permission, without getting your permission for any of the information to be disclosed for the preparation of the return, and without your signature? If so, they've committed an illegal, unlawful act, and you can make a lot of money suing them. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3. 4. 4. 5. 5. 5. 5. 6. 5. 6. 6. 6. 7. 7. 8. 8. 11. 6. 106. 7. 7. 8. 9. Oui. 106. 9. 106. How many of you have been noticed by the district director to maintain records and file returns and all of that kind of stuff as the law requires? 107. A client and a client's lawful wife hereby rebut the presumption of a requirement where none actually exists under law via this sworn affidavit, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the agency, Secretary of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service, which must then disprove a client's and a client's lawful wife's statements and cannot. 108. 108. That on June 18, 1998, a United States Marshal came to a client's domicile in Eager, Arizona, to serve a summons for criminal trial in U.S. District Court. He said in Phoenix, Arizona, on the legal fictions, capital W-I, these are all capital letters, folks, all capital letters. That's how you tell a legal fiction from a real person. W-I-L-L-I-A-M-C-O-O-P-E-R, all capitals, and A-N-N-I-E-M-O-R-D-H-O-R-S-T, all capital letters. 109. That a client noticed the U.S. Marshal that a client is not the legal fictions named in the summons and ordered him off the property. 110. That a client noticed the United States Marshal that he was trespassing. 111. That a client noticed the United States Marshal that he has no federal jurisdiction or authority within the territorial boundaries of the state of Arizona. 112. That the United States Marshal did not serve the summons. 113. 114. That the United States Marshal obeyed a client's demand and notice to vacate the property due to unlawful trespass. 114. That a client and a client's lawful wife are not the legal fictions spelled in all capital letters W-I-L-L-I-A-M-C-O-O-P-E-R and are in all capital letters A-N-N-I-E-M-O-R-D-H-O-R-S-T. Are any other fiction named in the summons signed by United States District Court Judge Irwin? 115. 115. That no summons has ever been served upon the affiant or affiant's lawful wife at any time whatsoever by anyone whomsoever. 116. 116. That any summons issued by a federal judge of a federal court upon citizens of any state domiciled within the territorial boundaries of that state is unconstitutional and unlawful when jurisdiction is challenged unless and until the United States first proved their jurisdiction over such land, property, business, and citizens. 117. That any arrest warrant issued by any federal judge of any federal court due to failure to appear in any federal court against a summons which was never served is unconstitutional and unlawful and is void upon its inception. 118. That any arrest warrant issued by any judge of any federal court against any citizens of any state domiciled within the territorial boundaries of any state, any union state, is unconstitutional and unlawful when jurisdiction of the United States is challenged unless and until the United States first proved their jurisdiction over such land, property, business, and citizens. 119. On July 1, 1998, U.S. District Court Judge Irwin unconstitutionally and unlawfully stepped out outside the jurisdiction and authority of the United States when he issued a bench warrant for the arrest of the legal fictions known as, all in capital letters, all in capital letters, W-I-L-L-I-A-M-C-O-O-P-E-R, and all in capital letters, A-N-N-I-E-M-O-R-D-H-O-R-S-T, –comma, for not appearing in his court on unconstitutional, and unlawful summons which was never served. The United States has no jurisdiction or venue within the territorial boundaries of the state of Arizona except over land that was ceded to the United States by the state legislature. 120. That the federal income tax is void because the administrative and enforcement powers are unconstitutional. Supreme Court ruling in 240. United States Supreme Court 1,36. Supreme Court 236,60. Capital L period. Capital E small d period. 493. Frank R. Bruchaber. APPT period versus Union Pacific Railroad Company number 140. Argued October 14th and 15th, 1915. Decided January 24th, 1916. Affirmed. The Supreme Court ruled, quote, We have not referred to a contention that because certain administrative powers to enforce the act were conferred by the statute upon the Secretary of the Treasury. Therefore, it was void as unwarrantedly delegating legislative authority because we think to state the proposition is to answer it, end quote. The Supreme Court cited Marshall Field and Company versus Clark 143, United States Supreme Court 649,36. Capital L period. ED period. 294. 12. C.T. Rep. 495. Butterfield versus Stranahan 19. 214. C.T. Supreme Court. 29. Sup. C.T. Rep. 671. Note, the Supreme Court not only referred to the contention, but stated it, and thus answered it, citing case precedent. In answering the contention in the ruling of the court, the Supreme Court justices have rendered the federal income tax void. Since no one else, to my knowledge, has ever cited this fact, the courts probably will not honor the ruling. Nevertheless, it is a factual statement under the law that Congress cannot delegate its powers to anyone or anything or any entity. Another factual statement in the law is that the Congress cannot breach the balance of power between branches of government by giving its legislative power to the executive or judicial branches of government. Both of these statements are set in stone. For either one or both of those reasons, the federal income tax and the Internal Revenue Service are unconstitutional. The first time this contention is brought before the Supreme Court, the income tax must be struck down. 121. That between the years 1970 and 1973, while a member of the intelligence briefing team, petty officer of the watch and the command center, and speakat operator of the KL-47 for Admiral Bernard Clary, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, affiant witnessed the Majesty 12 plan to disarm the American people, destroy the United States of America, and institute world totalitarian socialist government. The plan included a statement that the so-called income tax is the unconstitutional implementation of the graduated income tax required as plank number two of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel's Communist Manifesto. 122. That affiant has never knowingly or intentionally defrauded any bank. All contracts have been honored and all loans repaid on time and in full, except for one which loan is current and paid up to date according to contract. 123. That affiant has not obtained a loan of any kind from any bank in over 17 years. 124. That affiant's lawful wife has obtained five loans from a bank, an individual, or a lending institution as a single woman. 125. That in each instance of obtaining a loan from a bank, individual, or lending institution, a affiant's lawful wife have, without fail, informed the bank, individual, or lending institution, of our married status. 126. That in each instance of obtaining a loan from a bank, individual, or lending institution, affiant and affiant's lawful wife have asked the representative of the bank, individual, or lending institution to make the loan to affiant's lawful wife as a single woman because of the immediate danger that affiant might be killed due to his status as an enemy of the socialist subversives operating within the United States government. 127. That in each instance of obtaining a loan from a bank, individual, or lending institution, affiant and affiant's lawful wife have followed the instructions of the representative of the lending institution, individual, or bank. That all letters delivered, forms filled out, or forms signed by affiant or affiant's wife were at the instruction of the representative of the bank, individual, or lending institution for the purpose of facilitating the loans to affiant's lawful wife as a single woman. 128. That following the instructions of the lending representative of any bank, individual, or lending institution after having given full disclosure of our marital status is not fraud. 129. That as all letters delivered, forms filled out, or forms signed by affiant or affiant's wife were at the instruction of the lending representative of the bank, individual, or lending institution for the purpose of facilitating the loans to affiant's lawful wife as a single woman. There can be no fraud. 130. That all monetary figures given to any representative of a bank, individual, or lending institution as monies earned by affiant and are affiant's lawful wife were always much lower than actual monies earned during any period of time requested, stating a lower figure always makes it more difficult to obtain a loan and is not fraud. 131. That it is much more difficult for a single woman with children to obtain a loan than a married woman, making it more difficult upon oneself to obtain a loan is not fraud. 132. That fraud requires intent to defraud, and no such intent has ever been present in any of affiant's or affiant's lawful wife's dealings with any bank, individual, or lending institution. Affiant's intent was to protect his lawful wife and children against the possibility of affiant's murder by a despotic government. All contracts have been honored, and all loans repaid on time and in full, except for one which loan is current and paid up to date according to contract. 133. That the only outstanding loan is on the headquarters of a constitutional contractual pure trust for which affiant and affiant's wife are the trustees. The transfer of title is registered with the Apache County Recorder in St. John's, Arizona. The lending institution has accepted all payments by check drawn on the trust account. The property has been legally and lawfully transferred from affiant's wife to the trust, even though the loan remains in the name of affiant's wife. According to law, affiant's wife holds title in trust as trustee. 134. That all applications for loans by affiant's lawful wife were accepted and signed by the representative of the bank, individual, or lending institution, as true and correct, approved, and accepted. 135. That any representative who attests to anything other than what is sworn to in this affidavit is acting only to protect his or her job and to cover his or her own actions in advising us in the particular manner dictated to us in order that affiant's wife could obtain the loan or loans as a single woman. Any loan obtained in this manner cannot be and is not fraud. 136. That affiant is a member of the constitutional and lawful constituted unorganized militia of the state of Arizona and of the United States of America. 137. That the affiant and the militia have the right and the duty guaranteed by the Constitution for the United States of America and the Constitution of the state of Arizona to keep and bear arms in defense of affiant's property, the state of Arizona, and the Constitution for the United States of America. 138. That if the United States will not enforce the laws of the Union, it is the right and the duty of the militia to enforce the laws of the Union. 138. That affiant and the militia have the right and the duty to stand and fight the United States government's despotic and tyrannical, unconstitutional, and unlawful usurpation of power and jurisdiction with all the means at affiant's and the militia's disposal, including, but not limited to, the force of arms, any assault which may be mounted upon affiant's family, affiant's property, and any other property for which affiant may be responsible. 139. Affiant and or affiant's wife are not anti-government, radical, fundamentalist, crazy, suicidal, criminal, child molesters, bank robbers, child abusers, tax protesters, bank defrauders, wife beaters, husband beaters, drug users, drug dealers, drug growers, drug stockpilers, revolutionaries, subversives, terrorists, white supremacists, racists, anti-Semitic, or any other demonizing label that may be applied. Affiant and affiant's wife do not have illegal weapons, hand grenades, bombs, missiles, tanks, machine guns, anti-tank rockets, anti-aircraft weapons, or any other demonized instrument of any type whatsoever. The trust headquarters and the domicile of affiant and affiant's wife as trustees is not a compound. We will take this up and hopefully finish tomorrow. Good night, ladies and gentlemen. God bless each and every single one of you. Hope you're learning something. But more than that, I hope you're waking up. Whether you agree with me or not, stop believing in things just because somebody else told you to. That is absolutely the most disgusting thing that I can think of in this country. Do it. Heckman, thank you. God bless you. God bless you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Why is it that our local law enforcement officers do not know that when Arizona became a state, Arizona reserved jurisdiction for the state of Arizona over all public lands held in federal trust? In other words, ladies and gentlemen, the jurisdiction belongs to the state of Arizona, not the United States Forest Service or the BLM. Get the wool out from over your eyes. Stop being hoodwinked. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Just grow up. Grow up. Be adults instead of children. Please. Are you going to lose your country, your rights, your birthright, your children, your property, everything that you can think of is going to be gone if you don't wake up. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Guess who the rainbows were in the 1800s, ladies and gentlemen? Guess who was persecuted because they were different? Because they dressed differently. They had different laws for themselves and a different religion. They were the rainbows in the 1800s. They're known today as the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints, the Mormon Church. Shame on all of you who have persecuted the church.